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Class Dismissed? The Potential Unavailability of
Class Actions Under Mineral Code Article 137 in
Louisiana Federal Courts
INTRODUCTION
Louisiana state courts and Louisiana federal courts differ
concerning the availability of class notice under Mineral Code
article 137, which requires mineral lessors to give 30 days’ notice
before receiving the right to sue for unpaid or underpaid mineral
royalties.1 Unfortunately, the Louisiana legislature was unclear on
Mineral Code article 137’s applicability to class actions, leading to
judicial interpretation. The Louisiana state courts hold that notice
under Mineral Code article 137 is satisfied when a single plaintiff
gives notice on behalf of the entire class.2 These cases reason that
Mineral Code article 137’s “notice as a prerequisite” requirement
intends to give the lessee reasonable warning of the nature of the
demand for unpaid or underpaid royalties, which a single demand
letter by a class representative successfully accomplishes.3
Therefore, a class may be analyzed for certification even though the
unnamed class plaintiffs do not give notice under Mineral Code
article 137.
On the other hand, Louisiana federal courts hold that the
Louisiana state courts’ interpretation of Mineral Code article 137 is
incorrect. They reason that, if the Louisiana Supreme Court heard
the issue, it would strictly read Mineral Code article 137’s text to not
allow class notice in mineral royalty lawsuits.4 Thus, under the
Louisiana federal courts’ interpretation, unnamed class plaintiffs
who fail to provide notice under Mineral Code article 137 may not
participate in a class action. This interpretation has serious
ramifications for the utility, and possibility even the availability, of
mineral royalty class actions in Louisiana federal courts.
In early 2013, the Western District of Louisiana confronted the
necessary question of whether Mineral Code article 137, as
interpreted by Louisiana federal courts, applies in federal court
because its prohibition of class notice creates tension with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions in federal
Copyright 2015, by WILLIAM K. WRIGHT IV.
1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:137–31:138 (2013).
2. Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1011 (La. App.
1 Cir. 1997); Duhé v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So. 2d 1070, 1087 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2001).
3. Lewis, 398 So. 2d at 1011. See also Duhé, 779 So. 2d at 1086.
4. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 128 F.Supp.2d 961, 969
(W.D. La. 2001). See also Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL
1868750, at *1, *9 (W.D. La. 2011).
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court.5 Under a line of cases after the Supreme Court of the United
States’ Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins decision, a federal court must
conduct a special analysis to determine whether a federal rule or a
colliding state rule applies to the issue at hand.6 Moreover, although
Hanna v. Plumer provides the proper analytical framework for
resolving potential conflicts between state rules and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has not conclusively explained
how to determine whether a collision exists.7 The Court’s fractured
decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate
Insurance Co. demonstrates this notion.8
Confronted with this difficult jurisprudence, the Western District
of Louisiana applied the narrowest Shady Grove opinion,9
concluding that the federal courts’ interpretation of Mineral Code
article 137 indeed applied.10 However, considering the tenuousness
of the Shady Grove decision,11 as well as the fact that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has yet to speak on the proper interpretation of
Mineral Code article 137 as it relates to class notice, this problem
remains an open issue.
Therefore, this comment will accomplish two goals. First, it
will demonstrate that the proper interpretation of Mineral Code
article 137 does not allow class notice by applying Louisiana
principles of statutory interpretation to derive the proper
interpretation of Mineral Code article 137. Second, this comment
will conclude that the federal courts should apply the proper
interpretation of Mineral Code article 137 despite apparent conflict
with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because
Mineral Code article 137 and Rule 23 perform completely different
functions. This will be accomplished by demonstrating that, while
the Louisiana federal courts were correct in their assertion that
Mineral Code article 137 and Rule 23 do not cover the same
5. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 951251, at *1, *6
(W.D. La. 2013).
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (standing for the proposition that the Rules of
Decision Act—and federalism principles—requires federal courts to apply the
rules of decision of the state providing the cause of action).
7. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Hanna is part of a line of cases referred to as the
“procedural Erie doctrine.” Readers unfamiliar with, or who need a refresher on
the doctrine, should refer to Part IV, particularly note 132 and accompanying
discussion.
8. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). Shady Grove was a plurality opinion with a Justice
count of 4 plurality-1 concurring-4 dissenting. Moreover, the concurring Justice,
Justice Stevens, has since retired from the Court, and we have yet to discover
Justice Kagan’s stance on this doctrine.
9. See infra note 68 and accompanying discussion.
10. Williams, 2013 WL 951251 at *10–12.
11. See supra note 8.
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ground, there are additional reasons for such a conclusion. Also,
this comment will demonstrate that Shady Grove did not affect the
collision analysis as it pertains to Mineral Code article 137.
Part I of this comment briefly discusses Louisiana Mineral
Code article 137 and the Mineral Code as a whole. Part II
discusses the problem this comment intends to resolve: the
divergence between Louisiana state courts and Louisiana federal
courts on the issue of class notice under Mineral Code article 137.
Part III conducts a statutory analysis of Mineral Code article 137,
employing principles of Louisiana statutory interpretation, in order
to unearth the correct interpretation of Mineral Code article 137.
Part IV discusses the development of the procedural Erie doctrine
from Erie to Shady Grove. Finally, Part V demonstrates that the
proper interpretation of Mineral Code article 137 does not collide
with Federal Rule 23 and will survive a proper application of the
Erie/Hanna analysis.
I. THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE AND MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 137
The Louisiana Mineral Code is intended to be “supplementary . .
. to the Louisiana Civil Code.”12 Because the mineral laws of
Louisiana devolved from the Civil Code, the Louisiana Legislature
intended the Mineral Code to be a “specialized extension of the
Civil Code,” even though such provisions are part of Louisiana’s
Revised Statutes.13 Further, the comment to Mineral Code article 2
explicitly states that an “additional purpose of Article 2 is [to]
prevent . . . the inappropriate transfer of the principles of the Mineral
Code . . . to resolve questions that are properly governed by the
general principles of the Civil Code.” 14
Louisiana Mineral Code article 137 is the crux of the set of
rights and procedures—collectively found in Mineral Code articles
137-141—that Louisiana offers to parties to sue for past-due or
underpaid mineral lease royalties. Mineral Code article 137 requires
a mineral lessor who “seeks relief for the failure of his lessee to
make timely or proper payment of royalties [to give] his lessee
12. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2 (2013).
13. Id. at cmt. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:1 cmt. (2013) (“Although
the authorized forms of citation include reference to provisions of this code by
using the traditional form for citation of the Revised Statutes, it is hoped that
because of the relationship of this code to the Civil Code and the attempt to
structure it more in the style of a code than a statute, the preferred practice will
grow to be that of citing particular provisions as articles of the Mineral Code.”).
14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2 cmt. (2013) This demonstrates that the
provisions of the Mineral Code are to be interpreted using the Civil Code’s
interpretative methods, which is discussed infra Part III.A–B.
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written notice of such [failure to pay] as a prerequisite” to bringing a
lawsuit.15 After the lessor waits a minimum of 30 days for the
lessee’s response, he then receives the right to file a lawsuit seeking
remedies that are based on the response—or lack thereof—from the
lessee.16 Further, the lessee’s response directly affects the remedies
the lessor may seek.17
II. LOUISIANA’S JURISPRUDENTIAL DIVIDE REGARDING ARTICLE 137
Louisiana courts, state and federal alike, agree that plaintiffs
“have no right to proceed” with a mineral royalty action if they fail
to comply with the requirements of Mineral Code article 137’s
notice prerequisite.18 However, the Louisiana state courts and
Louisiana federal courts do disagree on whether a named class
plaintiff can provide article 137 notice on behalf of unnamed
mineral lessors who are purported class plaintiffs.
A. Louisiana State Court Jurisprudence
Sans one case,19 Louisiana state courts have held that class notice
is acceptable under article 137.20 In Lewis v. Texaco Exploration &
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (2013) (“[W]ritten notice . . . [is a]
prerequisite to a judicial demand for damages or dissolution of the lease.”)
[hereinafter article 137].
16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:138 (2013) (“The lessee shall have thirty days
after receipt of the required notice . . . to pay the royalties due or to respond by
stating in writing a reasonable cause for nonpayment. The payment or nonpayment
of the royalties or stating or failing to state a reasonable cause for nonpayment . . .
has the following effect on the remedies of dissolution and damages.”). LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31:138.1–31:141 (2013) stipulate the different remedies available,
depending on whether and how the lessor responds.
17. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:138.1–31:141 (2013) (discussing
the types of remedies offered based on how the lessee responds to article 137
notice).
18. See, e.g., Rebstock v. Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636, 642–43
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1981). Louisiana federal courts also agree with the notion that lack
of Mineral Code article 137 notice is an absolute bar to seeking a mineral royalty
claim. See also Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750,
at *1, *6 (W.D. La. 2011) (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd.,
128 F.Supp.2d 961, 965 (W.D. La. 2001)).
19. See Stoute v. Wagner & Brown, 637 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (La. App. 1 Cir.
1994) (adopting the findings of the trial court as its own, which found that “only
those royalty owners who have written a demand for past royalties may sue their
gas producers . . . therefore, there are a limited number of royalty owners who
have the right to sue”).
20. See Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1997), writ denied, 706 So. 2d 454 (La. 1997); Duhé v. Texaco, Inc.,
779 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2001), writ denied, 791 So. 2d 637 (La. 2001).
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Production Company, five lessors sent Texaco, the mineral lessee,
two demand letters demanding proceeds from a contract dispute
settlement between Texaco and another oil company.21 One demand
letter was on behalf of all mineral lessors, while the other was on
behalf of themselves, as individual plaintiffs.22 Texaco objected,
arguing that article 137 “does not permit a written demand for royalty
payments to be made on behalf of unnamed lessors.”23 In its analysis,
the court recognized that “the notice requirements set forth in [article
137] are an indispensible prerequisite to a judicial demand . . . .”24
The court found that “[n]owhere in the statute is there a
requirement that . . . notice be given by each and every mineral
lessor individually.”25 The court also found that article 137’s use of
“he” and “lessor” in the singular is not indicative of legislative intent
to require individual notice because Louisiana interpretative
techniques allow the singular and the plural to be interchangeable.26
Finally, the court found that the “obvious purpose” of article 137
notice is to give the lessee reasonable notice of a deficient payment
and reasonable time to correct it after an appropriate investigation.27
The court reasoned that, because the representative plaintiffs’ class
demand letter fully apprised Texaco of (1) the nature of the claim
for unpaid royalties, (2) the identity of the lessors for whom the
demand was made, and (3) what contracts were in dispute, Texaco
was able to conduct a reasonable investigation into the claims and
adequately respond under Mineral Code article 138.28 Thus, the
class was subsequently certified as a class action under Louisiana
law.29
However, the three-judge panel produced one dissent.30 Judge
Parro explained that article 137 is “clear and unambiguous,” requiring
“each lessor [to] give written notice to his lessee based on the
individual contractual relationship between the lessor and the
lessee.”31 He further reasoned that article 137 does not authorize one
21. 698 So. 2d at 1006.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1007. In other words, Texaco argued that there was no such thing
as a “‘class action’ demand letter” under article 137. Thus, those plaintiffs who
had not individually given article 137 notice had no right of action.
24. Id. at 1009.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court seemed to believe that allowing Texaco to investigate each
plaintiff’s claim was more important than meeting the requirements for a class
action.
27. 698 So. 2d at 1010.
28. Id. at 1011.
29. Id. at 1016.
30. Id. (Parro, J., dissenting).
31. Id. (Parro, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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lessor to give notice on behalf of another lessor, whether named or
unnamed.32 He refuted the majority’s contention that no jurisprudence
exists on the adequacy of notice by pointing out that the same court’s
1994 opinion in Stoute v. Wagner & Brown strictly interpreted the
language of article 137 to find that class notice is prohibited by the
plain meaning of the article.33 Although Judge Parro did not rule out
the possibility of class actions so long as each individual class
plaintiff gives individual notice, he noted that he would have held that
the plain language of article 137 does not allow one class
representative (or a few class representatives) to give notice on behalf
of other, unnamed plaintiffs.34
In a similar case, Duhé v. Texaco, a unanimous panel cited
Lewis’ holding and reasoning with approval.35 In Duhé, Texaco
argued that the district court erred in certifying the class because not
all class members made individual, written demands pursuant to
article 137.36 Mirroring the Lewis decision, the Duhé court rejected
Texaco’s argument, and instead, the court concluded article 137
does not require individual notice in a multiple-plaintiff lawsuit,
such as a class action.37 Moreover, the court reasoned that it is
“sufficient if the notice fully and completely notifies the lessee of
the demands of the named plaintiffs, as well as the intention of those
named plaintiffs to demand royalty payments on behalf of a class of
royalty owners.”38
Louisiana courts tend to allow class representatives to give
notice on behalf of unnamed class plaintiffs in mineral royalty
class actions. However, while the Louisiana jurisprudence provides
some indication that article 137 notice can be given by a class
representative (or by multiple class representatives) on behalf of a
class of mineral lessors, the Louisiana federal courts reject this line
of jurisprudence in reaching the exact opposite conclusion.
Additionally, Louisiana federal courts reject the notion that class
32. Id. (Parro, J., dissenting).
33. 698 So. 2d at 1016 (Parro, J., dissenting) (citing Stoute v. Wagner &
Brown, 637 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994)). The majority cited
Stoute in its opinion also, but only for the class certification analysis, not for the
class notice analysis. See also Willis v. Franklin, 420 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1982). Although Willis concerned multiple plaintiffs and did not
give rise to a class action, its individual notice analysis was likewise applicable
in Lewis.
34. Lewis, 698 So. 2d at 1017 (Parro, J., dissenting).
35. Duhé v. Texaco, 779 So. 2d 1070, 1087 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2001).
36. Id. at 1075.
37. Id. at 1087 (affirming the district court’s certification of the class because
article 137’s notice prerequisite was met, as well as the class certification
prerequisites under Louisiana law).
38. Id.
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notice satisfies article 137 and require that each individual lessor
give his lessee notice, regardless of whether the defendant lessee is
the same for each purported class plaintiff.39
B. Louisiana Federal Court Jurisprudence
Two Louisiana federal court cases considered the issue of class
notice under article 137: Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish
School Board40 and Williams v. Chesapeake Louisiana., Inc.41 In
both of these cases, the federal court ruled that the plain language
of article 137 does not permit class notice.42 However, the opinions
do not explicitly hold whether the plain language of article 137
completely prohibits class actions or merely prohibits class actions
where each class plaintiff has not given individual notice.
In Vermillion, Chevron and other oil company lessees sought a
declaratory judgment, arguing that (1) the demand letters sent by
the class representatives on behalf of a class of mineral lessors
were insufficient to satisfy article 137’s requirement, and (2) the
demand letters failed to reasonably put the oil companies on notice
of the individual claims of either the class representatives or the
unnamed class plaintiffs.43 The district court found that each class

39. The route the Louisiana federal courts follow mirrors the Louisiana state
court decision of Stoute v. Wagner & Brown, 637 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (La. App. 1
Cir. 1994), and Judge Parro’s dissent in Lewis v. Texaco, 698 So. 2d 1001,1016
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1997) (Parro, J., dissenting).
40. The Vermillion case has a tumultuous procedural history. The relevant
decisions for the purposes of this comment are found in three different citations,
all with the title Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish School Board. The
court of first instance was the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana. 128 F.Supp.2d 961 (W.D. La. 2001). Then, the case was
referred to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which made a ruling
and certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 364 F.3d 607 (5th Cir.
2004). After the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to answer the certified
question, 872 So. 2d 533 (La. 2004), the case returned to the Fifth Circuit. 377
F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2004).
41. Similar to the Vermillion case, the Williams case also has a turbulent
procedural history. The three relevant decisions for this comment are unreported
decisions out of the Western District of Louisiana. Williams v. Chesapeake La.,
Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *1 (W.D. La. 2011); Williams v.
Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 951251, at *1 (W.D. La. 2013);
Williams v. Chesapeake La. Inc., 2013 No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 5295692 (W.D.
La. 2013).
42. Vermillion, 128 F.Supp.2d at 967-68. See also Williams, 2013 WL 951251
at *2 (“The court is satisfied with its interpretation of Louisiana law, this is, [article
137] requires notice to the lessee as a prerequisite to suit.”).
43. Vermillion, 128 F.Supp.2d at 961.
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plaintiff must give article 137 notice44 because such a rule is clear,
unambiguous, and produces no absurd consequences.45 Because of
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s silence regarding the availability of
class notice under article 137, the court reasoned that the Louisiana
Supreme Court would follow the Stoute decision, reject the Lewis
majority,46 and preclude class notice under article 137.47 However,
recognizing the importance of the issue, the district court certified
its decision to the Fifth Circuit to either certify the question to the
Louisiana Supreme Court or dispose of the issue itself.48
After receiving the certified issue, the Fifth Circuit in turn
certified the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court,49 which
declined to answer the certified question.50 When the case returned
44. Id. at 968. The district court looked to the Stoute case, which held that
only those lessors that sent timely article 137 notice could proceed with the
lawsuit and decided that the Louisiana Supreme Court would adopt the
interpretation of Stoute.
45. Id. at 967–68. The district court found that the royalty owners’ demand
letters were “legally insufficient” to serve as written notice on behalf of unnamed
royalty owners under article 137, “and, therefore, class action relief [was]
unavailable under such circumstances.” The district court’s phrasing is curious
because it says “class action relief is unavailable under such circumstances”
(emphasis added). This raises the question of whether the court intended to rule that
class notice is unavailable at all times under article 137 or unavailable only when
each class member fails to give individual notice. While it is hard to envision a
situation where representatives of a class of plaintiffs can argue that every “similarly
situated” plaintiff possible gave individual notice, the court here approved of Stoute
v. Wagner & Brown, 637 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994), which found “a
limited number of royalty owners . . . have the right to sue” in reference to the class
representatives who gave individual notice. This indicates that class actions are
likely available as long as each class plaintiff gives notice pursuant to article 137.
This contemplates that the unnamed class plaintiffs that give article 137 notice are
removed from the class, and those that gave article 137 notice may proceed with the
class action if pursuing it is still desirable.
46. The district court would follow Judge Parro’s Lewis dissent. Lewis v.
Texaco, 698 So. 2d 1001,1016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1997) (Parro, J., dissenting). See
also Part II.A.
47. Id. at 968-69. The district court justified taking an “Erie guess” as to
what the Supreme Court of Louisiana would decide if it heard the case. Under
Erie, the federal courts are to apply the substantive law of the forum state. When
a state supreme court has not issued a ruling on the issue, a federal court may
essentially sit as a state high court and consider a wide range of sources and
policy considerations to arrive at the proper construction of the state law.
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
48. Id. at 969. The court did this in accordance with Rule 50 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
49. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 364 F.3d 607 (5th
Cir. 2004).
50. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 872 So. 2d 533 (La.
2004). The Louisiana Supreme Court could have resolved the issue by devising
the proper construction of article 137 as it relates to class notice. Instead, the

2015]

COMMENT

573

to the Fifth Circuit, the court encountered the choice of either
accepting the Louisiana state courts’ interpretation of article 137,
or affirming the district court’s interpretation of article 137. The
court chose the latter option, holding that it was not bound by any
Louisiana state court decision because the “jurisprudence ha[d] not
developed to the status of jurisprudence contstante,”51 and the
plain language of the statute led to the conclusion that class notice
is not compatible with article 137.52
The Fifth Circuit also considered the context of article 137 with
Mineral Code articles 138-141 and properly understood that article
137 bore a significant relationship to the rights and remedies that
arose depending on how the lessee responds to article 137 notice.53
The Fifth Circuit provided three reasons why this relationship is
both “incompatible with allowing notice to be given on a class
basis”54 and thwarts the power balance the Louisiana Legislature
intentionally created by providing lessors a method to vindicate
their royalty claims, while giving lessees a reasonable delay to
avoid the “harsh remedy” of cancellation.55
First, permitting class notice in this type of statutory
framework would deprive the lessee of any realistic chance to
reasonably respond within the 30-day timeframe.56 Second, it was
court abdicated its judgment to the U.S. Fifth Circuit, leading to the divergence
this comment discusses and seeks to resolve.
51. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 377 F.3d 459, 462 (5th
Cir. 2004). See, e.g., Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000),
which illustrates the application of jurisprudence constante. Jurisprudence constante
is a civil law principle that embodies a fundamental difference between the common
law and the civil law. Succinctly put, case law does not have the same precedential
effect as it does at common law, which allows civilian judges to disregard past
decisions that are not “a constant stream of uniform . . . rulings having the same
reasoning.” This means that legislation is the supreme source of law, and case law
merely is “evidence” of what the legislation means. Thus, case law does not have the
controlling effect on decisions that legislation possesses. This is why the Fifth
Circuit was comfortable with ignoring the few Louisiana cases interpreting article
137 in favor of the district court’s interpretation.
52. Vermillion, 377 F.3d at 461.
53. Id. at 462.
54. Id. at 463.
55. Id. at 464 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt. (2013)). The court
found that the Louisiana legislature was concerned with striking the balance
between giving lessors the right to a judicial remedy for unpaid mineral royalties
and limiting judicial dissolution of complex, economically-impactful, mineral
leases by promoting settlement before any litigation occurs.
56. Id. at 464. In this case, the intended class would have been made up of
each of Chevron’s mineral lessors in the entire state of Louisiana. The court
clearly was concerned about Chevron needing to go through every lease it had
with Louisiana residents to determine how to proceed.
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“questionable” whether the putative class representatives could
make an article 137 demand for lessors who do not know that
demand is being made on their behalf, or even want demand to be
made on their behalf.57 Third, it was unclear to the court to whom
the lessees should respond under Mineral Code article 138.58 The
third consideration is the most important because it is unclear what
the proper remedies are or who would receive the payments
because the statutory framework does not contemplate class
actions in mineral royalty lawsuits.
The most recent Louisiana federal court case that tackles the issue
of class notice under article 137 is Williams v. Chesapeake
Louisiana., Inc.59 In Williams, many mineral lessors sued Chesapeake
for underpaid mineral royalties after the named plaintiff purportedly
sent notice on behalf of the putative class. Like other courts that
assessed the issue, the district court understood the strong policy
consideration underlying the notice and reply framework of article
137, et seq.60 With this in mind, the district court followed the Fifth
Circuit’s Vermillion decision, holding that “as a matter of law” the
notice letter the lead plaintiff sent on behalf of herself and the other
mineral lessors, was insufficient to fulfill the others’ article 137 notice
requirement.61
However, Williams went further than Vermillion, explicitly
holding that “the putative class members did not have a substantive
right of action to seek unpaid mineral royalties” as a class under
article 137.62 The notion that the mineral lessors that failed to
provide article 137 notice had no right of action was not explicitly
mentioned in any previous article 137 class notice case. However,
in Vermillion, the district court subscribed to the notion of “no
notice, no right.”63 This demonstrates the court read article 137
notice to trigger a substantive right of action to claim unpaid or
57. Id.
58. Vermillion, 377 F.3d at 464.
59. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at
*1–2 (W.D. La. 2011) (finding that a mineral royalty lawsuit was proper
because “[im]proper payment,” such as underpayment, is a reason to provide
notice under article 137). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (2013).
60. Williams, 2011 WL 1868750 at *5. See also Vermillion, 377 F.3d at 464.
61. Vermillion, 377 F.3d at 464*11.
62. Id. (emphasis added). The closest a Louisiana court got to this notion
was that article 137 notice is an absolute prerequisite to suit. Rebstock v.
Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636, 642–43 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1981). See
also supra note 18 and accompanying discussion.
63. Williams, 2011 WL 1868750 at *5–6 (W.D. La. 2013) (“The Court is
satisfied with its interpretation of Louisiana law, that is, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§31:137 requires notice to the lessee as a prerequisite to suit.”).
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underpaid mineral royalties, which the unnamed class members
had failed to satisfy.64
In March 2013, the Williams court addressed the class notice issue
again, this time after recognizing a conflict between article 137 and
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of the Civil Procedure.65 Here, the
district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification for
the same reasons as set forth in its previous order.66 However, the
court recognized the real issue in the motion at bar was whether
article 137’s prohibition of class notice67 or Federal Rule 23, which
has no notice requirement, applied to the case. To analyze this issue,
the Western District turned to Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.68
Applying Justice Stevens’ Shady Grove principles,69 the district court
found that the properly-interpreted Louisiana rule must control.70
64. This notion is supported by Rebstock, 406 So. 2d at 642–43, as well as
Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1006 (La. App. 1
Cir. 1997). See also supra notes 18 and 21 and accompanying discussion.
65. Williams, 2011 WL 951251 at *2 (“[T]he issue before the Court is how
to resolve the conflict between this Louisiana statute and [Rule 23].”).
66. Id. at *5–6 (“The Court is satisfied with its interpretation of Louisiana law,
that is, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §31:137 requires notice to the lessee as a prerequisite to
suit.”).
67. Id. at *6. In other words, the correct interpretation of article 137, as the
Louisiana federal courts and this comment contend.
68. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
416 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). Shady Grove involved a fractured Supreme
Court employing three different methods to obtain two separate results, producing a
plurality opinion. The district court used Justice Stevens’ concurrence because it
provided the crucial fifth vote and concurred on the narrowest ground. Williams,
2013 WL 951251 at *11 (citing Garman v. Campbell County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630
F.3d 977, 983 n.6 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977)).
69. According to the Williams court, Justice Stevens found that the federal
rules must follow the Rules Enabling Act’s requirement to not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right granted by state law. Williams, 2013 WL
951251 at *9 (citing Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418). A federal rule that appears
to do so must be reasonably interpreted to avoid that result. Id. (citing Shady
Grove, 559 U.S. at 424–25). If the federal rule cannot be reasonably interpreted
to avoid abridgment, enlargement, or modification of any substantive right, thus
displacing a state law that looks procedural, but is nevertheless intertwined with
a state-created right, the state rule must be applied. Id. (citing Shady Grove, 559
U.S. at 423–24). The district court found that Rule 23 “‘categorically’” entitles
plaintiffs to pursue a class action in federal court when the four prerequisites are
met. Thus, a collision existed between Rule 23 and article 137. Id. (citing Shady
Grove, 559 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J.)). However, the district court held that
applying Rule 23 alters Louisiana substantive law, which is outside the
authorization of the Rules Enabling Act, and, therefore, the court was required
to apply article 137’s prohibition of class notice to the mineral royalty lawsuit.
Id. at *15–16. In other words, the district court found Rule 23 prevented article
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As demonstrated by the history of article 137 class notice in
both the Louisiana state and federal courts, a two-question inquiry
is required in order to determine the availability and utility of class
actions for Louisiana mineral royalty claims. First, does the proper
interpretation of article 137 preclude class notice? Second, is
article 137’s notice requirement applicable in Louisiana federal
courts in light of Rule 23?
III. THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLE 137 PRECLUDES
CLASS NOTICE
A. The Tenets of Louisiana Statutory Interpretation
Louisiana law is unique in that its civilian tradition dictates that
attorneys and judges look to a plain-language reading of legislation,
rather than the jurisprudence, in arguing and deciding cases.71 The
fundamental tenets of civil law dictate that judges are to extract as
much meaning out of the text of a Code article or statute in
determining its proper construction because the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the governmental body elected to make law.72 Only after
a judge thoroughly analyzes the text of a law may he proceed to other
forms of statutory interpretation, such as legislative intent.73 The
Mineral Code, as a supplement to the Civil Code, should be
interpreted in a similar fashion as Code articles.74

137’s no class notice rule from operating. The prohibition of class notice is “so
interwoven with [Louisiana’s] substantive law governing the payment of
mineral royalties in Louisiana that it is a substantive rule,” as demonstrated in
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 377 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir.
2004). See also supra note 554 and accompanying discussion.
70. Williams, 2013 WL 951251 at *13–15.
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2013) (“The sources of [Louisiana] law are
legislation and custom.”). See also id. cmt. c (“In Louisiana, legislation is superior to
any source of law.”). Jurisprudence, on the other hand, is just evidence of what the
law is and expounds on the proper interpretations of legislation. See also cases cited
supra note 51.
72. P. RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, LEGIS. LAW & PROC.
COMPANION HANDBOOK § 7.4, (2014 ed.) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter
LAMONICA & JONES].
73. Id. at § 7.6 (“It is only when the meaning of the words cannot be determined
from the legislation itself or through resort to statutes specifically addressing the
meaning of words used in the legislation . . . that there is a need to look beyond the
specific legislation.” (emphasis in original)).
74. See supra note 12 and accompanying discussion.

2015]

COMMENT

577

Articles 9 through 13 of the Louisiana Civil Code codify the
fundamental principles of Louisiana statutory interpretation.75
First, when the applicable law is clear and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to absurd results, the law must be applied
as written.76 A court may interpret no further, such as seeking
legislative intent, if application of the plain language produces a
result that is within the purpose of the law.77 However, if the
applicable law is susceptible to different meanings, and the plain
language approach fails, then the law must be interpreted as having
the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.78
Further, laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in
reference to each other.79 Finally, as stipulated in the Louisiana
Revised Statutes, the singular and plural are interchangeable when
interpreting Louisiana law.80
Only after the court fully attempts to extract the proper, plain
reading from the applicable law may the judge use legislative history,
along with logic and reason, in order to arrive at the proper
construction of the applicable law.81 Scholars call this type of
statutory interpretation, one that goes beyond the text into legislative
history and legislative purpose of the applicable law, the “historical
approach.”82 If the judge can ascertain the “broad statutory policy”

75. The techniques described above form what scholars call the exegetical
method of statutory interpretation.
76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2013).
77. Id. See also LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 72 at § 7.4. The test for
determining if an “absurd consequence” arises through applying plain meaning is to
assess whether a “factual result so inappropriate as to be deemed outside the
‘purpose’ of the law” occurs. If so, then the court may use other interpretative
methods, such as reason and legislative intent to reach the correct construction of the
law.
78. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 12 (2013);
LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 722 at § 7.6.
79. LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 10 (2013). See also LAMONICA & JONES, supra
note 722 at § 7.7 (“[S]tatutes on the same subject matter should be interpreted in
reference to each other, if such is necessary to determine the meaning of words or
phrases in a particular statute.”). This is called interpreting statutes in pari materia.
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:7 (2013).
81. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2013) (“To decide equitably, resort is made to
justice, reason, and prevailing usages.”).
82. For a full discussion on civilian statutory interpretation outside the text
of an applicable statute see LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 722 at §§ 7.8-7.9. It
suffices to say that the civilian tradition recognizes that the political, social, and
economic context of the applicable statute is valuable in discovering the purpose
of the statute. Further, legislative history is not the same as legislative intent,
although documents that comprise legislative history are great indicators of
legislative intent, or the purpose of the legislation.
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behind the applicable law, then he has gone a long way in identifying
“‘legislative intent’ or ‘legislative purpose.’”83
The Louisiana state courts clearly failed to apply these
interpretative methods properly in interpreting article 137 and its
related provisions. One can only reach the conclusion that article 137
does not offer class notice in mineral royalty lawsuits by employing
these interpretative tenets to both the plain language and the policy
behind Article 137.
B. Applying the Tenets of Louisiana Statutory Interpretation to
Article 137
Both the Louisiana state courts and the Louisiana federal courts
agree that notice is an absolute prerequisite to bringing a mineral
royalty lawsuit.84 This point of agreement narrows the issue to
whether article 137 allows class notice. Article 137 does not allow
class notice, but not merely for the reasons that the Louisiana
federal courts offer in their interpretation of article 137.85
The Lewis/Duhé analysis—the one employed by the Louisiana
state courts—is insufficient for multiple reasons.86 First, although
the Louisiana courts correctly recognized that the plain language
approach led to two different interpretations because the singular
and the plural are interchangeable, the court failed to read article 137
with the other royalty demand articles.87 If the court had done so, it
would have found that absurd results occur with its conclusion that
class notice is allowed under article 137, because different remedies
arise depending on how the lessor responds.88 In this way, the
Louisiana courts created a rule that requires a mineral lessor to
either (1) respond to one of the class representatives and be bound to
whatever remedy corresponds with the particular response given that
83. HETZEL, ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS, 565 (3d ed. 2001, Lexis Publishing).
84. See, e.g., Rebstock v. Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636, 643 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1994). Both the Louisiana state courts and federal courts cited to
Rebstock for this proposition. See also Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 101906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *1, *11 (W.D. La. 2011). See also supra note 62 and
accompanying discussion.
85. See supra Part I.B.
86. See supra Part I.A.
87. This is required by the Louisiana Civil Code. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 10 (2013). Correctly applying Civil Code article 10’s requirement would
have led to the proper construction of the plain language of article 137 to in fact
read the word “he” and “mineral lessor” in the singular because the other notice
and response Mineral Code articles would not allow otherwise without an
absurd result occurring.
88. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:138.1–140 (2013).
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class representative or (2) send different responses to each
individual plaintiff in the proposed class after conducting a rushed
investigation into hundreds, if not thousands, of mineral leases.89
Since article 137 notice is a process performed entirely before
litigation, the only way for mineral lessees to avoid either making a
rushed settlement or falling into one of the two aforementioned
response problems would be to seek a declaratory judgment.90
Forcing the mineral lessee to endure litigation expenses, rather than
having a fair chance to enjoy their pre-litigation rights under a
statutory framework, is clearly outside the intent of article 137.91
It stands to reason that, in Lewis, Texaco believed that the five
class representatives had no claim to royalty payments, so it
responded by giving reasons for nonpayment.92 Thus, Texaco was
placed in the position of not responding to the unnamed class
members because it only responded to the five lessors who sent
demand.93 However, such a response does not adequately respond to
the claims of other mineral lessors in the lawsuit because Texaco
could then be liable to the unnamed lessors for dissolution and/or
hefty damages. Just because Texaco, or another mineral lessor in the
same position, responds one way to the class representatives does
not lead to the conclusion that Texaco or another mineral lessor
would respond in kind to the others. This result is inequitable

89. The investigation must be done within 30 days under the threat of the
vesting of the plaintiffs’ right to sue in court. Moreover, the lessee is left
guessing as to whom he is supposed to send a response. Further, no rational
plaintiff’s attorney would grant an oil company an extension that would delay
the vesting of his client’s right of action, even assuming it were possible to do so
under the Mineral Code or some other Louisiana law. The possibility of
extending the time within which to give a response under Mineral Code article
138 is beyond the scope of this comment.
90. This is exactly what Chevron did in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion
Parish Sch. Bd., 128 F.Supp.2d 961 (W.D. La. 2001). Massive class action
damages can be extremely damaging to a company’s bottom line, which is
incentive to settle to avoid these damages plus the costs of defending a class
action. Pair this fact with Louisiana’s history as a state rich in oil, gas, and other
minerals, the Louisiana courts’ interpretation of article 137 will increase the
financial risk of doing business in Louisiana.
91. See supra note 555 and accompanying discussion. See also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt. (2013) (“The total effect of these articles, then, is to
provide a spur to timely payment of royalties due while giving lessees a
reasonable way to avoid the harsh remedy of cancellation. The spur is the
special remedy.”).
92. See Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1006
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1997).
93. See id.
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because Texaco had no way of knowing whether it had to respond to
all of the lessors individually or only the five class representatives.94
Second, the Louisiana state court’s analysis discounts the fact
that article 137 notice is a statutory prerequisite to the formation of
a right of action granted under Louisiana law.95 Certainly, a
proponent of the Louisiana state courts’ interpretation would argue
that article 137 notice can be given by a class representative on
behalf of unnamed class plaintiffs because the hallmark of a class
action is indeed a named plaintiff, or plaintiffs, asserting rights of
other plaintiffs that cannot, or choose not to, assert those rights
alone.96 However, this argument exaggerates the similarities
between the vesting of the right to bring a mineral royalty lawsuit
in Louisiana to the vesting of other claims that are traditionally
brought as a class action.97 In other words, for “traditional” mass
claims, each plaintiff’s right of action rises with the defendant’s
tortious action or breach of contract without requirements similar
to article 137 before the right to bring the claim rises. For example,
if consumers bring a traditional tort or contract class action against
a leading electronic developer, there are rarely any statutory
impediments to the vesting of each plaintiff’s right to sue. Reading
article 137 to allow one plaintiff to effectively create another’s
right of action by merely suggesting they could potentially make
up a class with a common claim leads to an absurd result outside
the purpose of article 137.
Moreover, neither Rule 23, nor its Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure analogue, requires plaintiffs to give notice to defendants
as a prerequisite to filing a class action.98 Rather, article 137
provides that prerequisite because it triggers a plaintiff’s substantive
right to bring a mineral royalty lawsuit, and Federal Rule 23 and
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 591 provide the
mechanism through which the Louisiana-granted right may be
enforced as a class action.99 While a mineral lessee might engage in
94. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013)
(“[A] plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of
the proposed class before the class is certified.”) (internal citations omitted).
This notion would lead mineral lessors to believe that the class representatives
cannot act on behalf of other mineral lessors prior to litigation, which includes
giving article 137 notice.
95. See discussion supra Parts II, II.B.
96. In essence, the “notice” would be filing a lawsuit, which effectively says, “I
am suing you, and all these other people might have the same claim as me.”
However, this is not how article 137’s framework is designed or intended to operate.
97. For example, a mass tort or mass breach of contract.
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 accord LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 591 (2013).
99. See, e.g., Andry v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A., Inc., 710 So. 2d 1126, 1128-29 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1998) (“A class action is no more than a procedural device; it confers no
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a policy to not pay its lessors, and thus be a prime circumstance for a
class action,100 this wrongful act differs from a mass tort or mass
contractual breach that can be brought as a class action because such
actions do not require the plaintiffs to give the defendants notice
prior to receiving the right to sue.101 However, article 137 operates
to require potential plaintiffs to give potential defendant lessees prelitigation notice, which allows the lessee to investigate and/or settle
the claim, before the right to sue develops.
Finally, the doctrine of vicarious exhaustion does not apply by
analogy to article 137 notice. Vicarious exhaustion allows a class
representative who properly exhausted his administrative remedies
prior to filing a lawsuit to pursue a class action on behalf of other
class plaintiffs who have not exhausted administrative remedies.102
If vicarious exhaustion is extended to article 137 notice, then a class
representative who effected article 137 notice may be able to pursue
a mineral royalty class action on behalf of unnamed plaintiffs who
did not give notice.
Although it seems article 137 may be similar to an exhaustion
requirement because it requires a plaintiff to satisfy a requirement
before filing a lawsuit, article 137 notice differs from an exhaustion
requirement because the rationales and policies underlying the
doctrine of exhaustion do not apply to article 137.103 Unlike cases
that implicate Title VII, the Social Security Act, or other laws that
require exhaustion of administrative remedies, article 137 does not
have an administrative process that must be respected in order for
substantive rights.”); Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332
(1980) (“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
100. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 23 and LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 591 (2013).
101. The uniquely civil law concept of placing the obligor in default before
having the right to obtain contractual breach damages does not bar a class action for
breach of contract because filing a lawsuit is the same as putting an obligor in
default. SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 1.11, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 220 (2d ed. 2001). There is no such requirement at common law. Article
137’s requirements are more stringent than the traditional method of putting the
obligor in default.
102. Elizabeth S. Hess, Administrative Exhaustion and Class Actions: Rules,
rights, Requirements, Remedies, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act Issue
Resolved, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 773, 784 (2003) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8 (1975)). Certain federal statutes, like Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, require plaintiffs to first bring their claim through an appointed federal
agency before suing in court. This is called an exhaustion requirement. Albamarle,
and many other cases, stand for the proposition that exhaustion for one class plaintiff
meets the exhaustion requirement for the other plaintiffs.
103. Id. Among those rationales are judicial efficiency and respecting the
administrative scheme.
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the parties and the judicial system to benefit and to promote the
interests of justice.104 Rather, the purpose of article 137 is to delay
the creation of a right of action to promote the policy goal of prelitigation settlement. However, with Title VII, the Social Security
Act, and other laws that require administrative exhaustion, the right
is present but must be tested via an administrative method before
troubling the court. Thus, article 137 is a statutory prerequisite to a
right to sue, rather than an exhaustion requirement.
Further, even if article 137 were an exhaustion requirement, the
doctrine of vicarious exhaustion has been refused in cases under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), where plaintiffs are required to file
an administrative claim prior to suing in federal court.105 Although
one such case allowed those class plaintiffs who satisfied the
administrative prerequisite to proceed with the class, those who failed
to exhaust were dismissed from the potential class.106 The court
reasoned that “the purpose and the language of the statute requires
claimants to have separately and individually satisfied all . . .
requirements . . . .”107 In this way, the FTCA operates in the same
way as article 137.108 The court further reasoned that the exhaustion
requirement was intended to “improve and expedite disposition of . . .
claims against the [defendant] by establishing a system of pre[]litigation settlement, to enable consideration of claims by the agency
having the best information concerning the incident, and to ease court
congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation.”109 Promoting prelitigation settlement and avoiding unnecessary litigation are exactly

104. Id. (citing Weinburger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975) (“Exhaustion
is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with
agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently . . . to afford the
parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile
a record which is adequate for judicial review.”)).
105. See, e.g., Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1977).
However, if the named plaintiffs can show that they have the authority to act on
behalf of the unnamed plaintiffs, the requirement would be satisfied. In
Lunsford, the court found it was not because the named plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that they had authority to settle on behalf of the unnamed plaintiffs.
Id. at 225-226. Undoubtedly, named article 137 plaintiffs would face the same
difficulty with a class action.
106. Id. The court also noted that many circuits, including the Fifth Circuit,
have held that administrative exhaustion is an “absolute prerequisite” to filing a
lawsuit under the FTCA. See, e.g., Molinar v. United States 515 F.2d 246, 249
(5th Cir. 1975).
107. Lunsford, 570 F.2d at 225 (internal citation omitted). This is similar to
the proper interpretation of article 137.
108. See supra notes 18 and 62 and accompanying discussion.
109. Lunsford, 570 F.2d at 224 (internal citation omitted).

2015]

COMMENT

583

the same policy goals of article 137.110 Thus, even if article 137 notice
can be considered an exhaustion requirement, the fact that article 137
is more analogous to the FTCA than other actions with exhaustion
requirements indicates that vicarious exhaustion would still be
unavailable.
As the Louisiana federal courts have recognized,111 the comment
to article 137 provides “the total effect”—in other words, the
policy—of the mineral royalty notice framework is “to provide a
spur to timely payment . . . while giving lessees a reasonable way in
which to avoid the harsh remedy of cancellation.”112 Thus, the
Louisiana state courts’ interpretation of article 137 defeats the
purpose of article 137 and its brethren articles.113 Although the plain
language of the statute seems clear at first, the fact that the singular
and the plural can be interchanged provides the potential for
ambiguity. Continuing along the plain language textual analysis and
reading article 137 with the other notice and remedy provisions, the
only choice is to construe the plain language of article 137 to mean
that each individual lessor must give his own notice. Allowing class
notice leads to absurd results because unsatisfactory problems
remain, such as (1) to whom the lessee’s response is owed; (2) what
remedies result from responding to either one, a few, or all of the
class plaintiffs; (3) pre-litigation settlement difficulties; and (4) the
fact that a lessee has to sift through hundreds of mineral leases to
determine how he is going to respond to each. Moreover, a mineral
royalty class action cannot be equated to a “traditional” class action,
such as a mass tort or contract class action, and the doctrine of
vicarious exhaustion cannot apply by analogy to allow for vicarious
notice under article 137.
Had the state courts read article 137 with reference to the other
articles in the notice and response scheme,114 they would have found
that the plain language approach led only to the conclusion that
using “he” in the singular was the appropriate interpretation in order
to avoid absurd results,115 as well as to match article 137’s policy.116
110. See supra in this Part. Litigation might be unnecessary under Mineral
Code articles 137-141 if the investigation revealed that the mineral lessee indeed
correctly paid the lessor. This is a tremendous benefit that article 137’s prelitigation process offers.
111. See supra notes 18 and 62 and accompanying discussions.
112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137, cmt. (2013).
113. See supra note 78 and accompanying discussion.
114. This is required by the Civil Code. See supra note 79.
115. See supra in this Part.
116. See Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1016 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1997) (Parro, J., dissenting). Judge Parro recognized that previous cases
required each individual plaintiff to provide notice, even in those cases where there
were more than merely two or three plaintiffs. Even though these cases are not the
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The fact that the remedy is determined based on the response given
by the lessor, the problems that class notice causes to the lessee’s
giving a response, and the fact that the non-notifying lessors do not
have a right to sue should have led the state courts to determine that
both the text of the statute and the policy behind it lead to the
prohibition of class notice in mineral royalty suits. Therefore, the
proper construction of article 137, as it relates to class notice, is that
each individual mineral lessor is required to provide his lessee with
individual notice.117
C. The Proper Construction of Article 137 Potentially Conflicts
With Federal Rule 23
As demonstrated in Williams v. Chesapeake Louisiana, Inc., the
correct interpretation of article 137, which disallows class notice,
presents a potential conflict with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.118 The proper interpretation of article 137 prohibits
class notice,119 whereas Rule 23 does not require class plaintiffs to
give notice to the defendant.120 Because of possible tension between
the Louisiana rule and Rule 23, it is crucial to determine whether
article 137’s proper interpretation survives a procedural Erie
doctrine collision analysis in the wake of Shady Grove.121
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL ERIE DOCTRINE
The law surrounding whether federal courts are to apply a state
rule that seemingly collides with a Federal Rule endures a tumultuous
history to say the least. The doctrine’s origins can be traced to Erie
and, for the time being, culminates with the Shady Grove opinion.

law, as discussed supra note 51, they are evidence of the proper construction of
article 137.
117. Although irrelevant for the scope of this comment, the Louisiana state
courts ought to apply this interpretation of article 137 as well.
118. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 951251, *1,
*6 (W.D. La. 2013). See also supra Part II.B.
119. See supra Part III.B.
120. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (West 2013) with FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(c)(2). Rule 23(c)(2) merely requires class members to receive knowledge
of a class action. Brief research reveals that cases which discuss Rule 23(c)(2)
contemplate class representatives giving notice to members of the same class in
order to maintain a class action in court, which is drastically different than
article 137’s pre-litigation requirement that potential plaintiffs give notice to
potential defendants in order to receive the right to sue in court.
121. Indeed, the Williams court diagnosed a conflict and applied the
procedural Erie doctrine accordingly.
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Many scholars consider Erie Railroad v. Tompkins to be
among the watershed cases in Supreme Court jurisprudence.122 The
Erie opinion redefined the federal courts’ position in the
constitutional structure, particularly focusing on what law federal
courts must apply when state law provides the cause of action.123
Erie involved a plaintiff from Pennsylvania suing a railroad
company, incorporated and operating out of New York, in
diversity for negligence after he was hit by a protruding piece of
the train while walking along the tracks.124 Unlike the common law
of Pennsylvania, which placed a duty on railroads only for willful
and wanton injury to people walking along their tracks, New York
had no rule regarding a railroad’s duty to keep the area clear from
hazards.125 Because neither Pennsylvania nor New York had a state
statute that determined the railroad’s duty, the district court was
able to determine the existence of duty on its own accord under the
so-called “general law.”126 Thus, the district court ruled that the
railroad had a duty of simple negligence to the plaintiff because the
court was free to determine the railroad’s duty as a matter of the
general commercial law, rather than applying Pennsylvania’s high
negligence standard.127
122. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
123. See id. at 71. Also, the Rules of Decision Act of 1789 required that state
law, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States
otherwise preempt, be the rules of decision in trials at common law in the
federal courts.
124. Id. at 69. The plaintiff sued in district court in New York, although
being a Pennsylvania citizen and injured in that state. The strategy behind this
decision is irrelevant for this comment.
125. Id. at 80.
126. Id. at 70. The concept of the “general law” developed from Swift v.
Tyson, which held that federal courts sitting in diversity need not apply the
common law of the state as declared by its highest court because of “free[dom]
to exercise . . . independent judgment as to what the common law of the state
is—or should be” in the absence of state, statutory law on the subject. Id. at 71
(summarizing the holding of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)). This concept
allowed federal courts sitting in diversity to make federal common law in areas
in which the neither states, nor Congress, has spoken through statutory law,
regardless of whether a state’s common law spoke on the matter at issue. See
also Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in Diversity
Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie
Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 22 (1995) (noting that,
according to the Swift Court, the Rules of Decision Act did not require federal
courts to follow state common law in diversity cases; rather, they were only
bound to follow state statutory law that governs the decision.) [hereinafter Ides].
127. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s finding
that the railroad had a duty to the plaintiff under the general law. Both the district
and appellate court refused to consider the applicability of Pennsylvania law because
the general law applied.
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis,
writing for the majority, took the opportunity to abolish the Swift
doctrine and reconfigure the federal court system to its correct place
in the constitutional structure.128 Justice Brandeis found that “no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer” the power to either the
federal court or Congress to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a state.129 Further, echoing the Rules of Decision
Act, the Court held that, in “any case,” the law to be applied in
federal courts, except in matters in which federal law preempts, is
the law of the state that provides the cause of action.130 Justice
Brandeis concluded by saying that the Swift doctrine “invaded rights
which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several states” and
adopted Justice Holmes’ noteworthy Black & White Taxicab Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co. dissent, claiming “‘the voice adopted
by the State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its
Supreme Court) should utter the last word.’”131
Because of Erie and the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, two types of Erie doctrine cases developed over the
decades: (1) cases that involved conflicts with state law and federal
common law and (2) cases that involved conflicts between state
rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.132 Although Erie
clarified that the federal courts must apply the law of the state that
gives rise to the lawsuit, it was unclear whether a federal court must
employ the Erie doctrine when a state rule collided with the newly
enacted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.133 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure seek to provide a uniform system of procedural
rules for the federal courts, and the Rules Enabling Act (REA)
delegated Congress’ Article III power to create and administer rules
for the federal courts to the Supreme Court.134 However, this
128. Ides, supra note 126 at 24–26, provides a more in-depth discussion of
Justice Brandeis’ denouncement of the Swift doctrine than is warranted in this
comment.
129. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
132. Compare Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 529 (1958)
with Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
133. See Ides, supra note 126, at 29 (“Of course the Erie decision had no
direct bearing on the legitimacy of the federal rules . . . Congress, pursuant to
Articles I and III and the necessary and proper clause, has ample power to
provide rules of procedure for federal courts.”).
134. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress . . . may
establish.” (emphasis added)); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1941); Ides, supra note 126, at 29.
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delegation of power comes with the caveat that the Federal Rules
may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”135 This
second type of Erie doctrine cases developed the “procedural Erie
doctrine.”
The first post-Erie Supreme Court case to tackle a collision
problem was Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.136 In Sibbach, the
plaintiff refused to submit to a physical examination, supporting this
refusal with a state rule that prohibited compulsion of a physical
examination; however, Federal Rule 35 permits compulsion of
physical examinations in federal court cases.137 In holding that Rule
35 applied, the Court reasoned that if the “rule really regulates
procedure,” then the Federal Rule is within the ambit of the Court’s
delegated powers under the REA and must apply because of the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.138 Because of this reasoning, the
first collision analysis necessarily assessed whether the Federal Rule
that conflicted with the state rule was “procedural,” rather than
“substantive,” in a way that would alter a substantive right, which
would violate the REA.139 If the Federal Rule indeed “really
regulated procedure,” then it would apply in the face of a conflicting
state rule.
Then, in 1965, the Supreme Court’s Hanna v. Plumer decision
applied the Sibbach test with crucial nuances, establishing the
modern framework for analyzing potential conflicts between state
rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.140 In Hanna, the
plaintiff completed domiciliary service upon the executor of the
defendant’s estate pursuant to Rule 4; however, Rule 4 did not
mirror the state rule, which required personal service on the
executor.141 In holding that Rule 4 controlled, the Hanna court first
found the REA requires a contrary state law to yield to a Federal
Rule if the Federal Rule “‘really regulates procedure’” and does
not violate the REA’s state substantive rights protection.142 Next,
and most important for this comment, Hanna recognized that Erie
did not “command . . . displacement of a Federal Rule,” but rather
required an analysis into whether the Federal Rule was even broad

135. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(b) (West 2014).
136. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
137. Id. at 6–7. Therefore, the Court had to determine whether the state rule
or Rule 35 applied to this diversity case in federal court.
138. Id. at 16.
139. Id. at 15.
140. 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965) (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). Sibbach’s
test is referred to as the “really regulates procedure” test.
141. Id. at 461–62.
142. Id. at 464–65 (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).
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enough to cover the point in dispute.143 Hanna is an important case
because it also provides the modern analysis for resolving conflicts
between state law and federal law.144
In Walker v. Armco Steel Co.,145 a unanimous Supreme Court
understood that the Hanna test was premised on a direct collision
between a state rule and federal rule, and the state rule applied if
there was no collision.146 Walker involved a conflict between a state
rule, which deemed an action “commenced” when service was
effectuated, and Federal Rule 3, which commences the action when
suit is filed.147 Finding no collision between the state rule and Rule 3
because both could coexist, the Court held that the state rule
determined when the action commenced.148
Decades of procedural Erie jurisprudence reached a climax in
Shady Grove. In this decision, the Supreme Court was unable to
reach a majority, leaving courts, such as the district court in
Williams v. Chesapeake, to use Justice Stevens’ analysis by virtue of
the Marks rule.149 To understand how substantial the rift among the
143. Id. at 470 (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1953)). In Palmer,
a unanimous Supreme Court completely avoided a conflict by reading Rule 8(c) to
not cover the same issue as a state rule. Palmer involved a dispute over which party
bore the burden of proving contributory negligence. The plaintiff argued that Rule
8(c) makes contributory negligence an affirmative defense that the defendant must
prove. Rejecting this argument, the Court held that Erie required application of state
burden of proof law since Rule 8(c) “covers only the manner of pleading,” not the
burden of proof.
144. According to Ides, supra note 126, at 74–87, the Hanna framework
functions as follows: (1) Determine whether a federal statute or state statute applies;
(2) If the Constitution, a federal statute, or treaty applies, then the Supremacy Clause
operates to make the federal law function; (3) Determine whether there is a collision
between the state rule and Federal Rule, and apply the Federal Rule if the REA is not
violated; (4) If no Federal Rule applies, apply the “outcome determinative” test,
which analyzes whether failing to apply a state rule in federal court changes the
outcome of the case merely because it is brought in federal court over state court.
Application of the test should keep in mind Erie’s twin aims of preventing forum
shopping and keeping the results the same in federal court as it would be in state
court. This comment focuses on step 3.
145. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
146. Id. at 749. See also Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–
5 (1987), which was a companion case to Walker (“The initial step [in analyzing
whether a state rule and Federal Rule collide] is to determine whether, when fairly
construed, the scope of [the] Federal Rule . . . is ‘sufficiently broad to cause a ‘direct
collision’ with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ before the court,
thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law.”).
147. Walker, 466 U.S. at 743.
148. Id. at 750–53. The Court also found Rule 3 gives “no indication that the
Rule was intended to toll a state statute of limitations.”
149. See supra note 68. See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed
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Shady Grove Justices really was, it is essential to acknowledge how
much the plurality deviated from the lower courts. Moreover, Shady
Grove failed to make any sense of the inconsistent approaches to
determine whether there is a collision between a state rule and a
Federal Rule.150
Shady Grove involved a group of doctors who sued Allstate after
the insurer failed to reimburse them for medical services rendered to
its insureds.151 Allstate objected to removal to federal court as a
class action under the Class Action Fairness Act152 because a New
York statute precluded class actions for claims with statutory
damages, which the Shady Grove doctors’ claim involved.153 The
New York rule created tension with Federal Rule 23, which governs
class actions and does not have such a limitation; instead providing,
Rule 23 stipulates prerequisites to filing and maintaining a class
action in federal court.154
Both the district court and the appellate court decided that New
York’s rule applied, finding that the legislative purpose of § 901(b)
does not lead to the conclusion that the New York rule collides with
Rule 23.155 The Second Circuit, in finding that New York’s rule

as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds . . .’”) (internal citation omitted).
150. See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the
Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1135–36
(2011) (noting—and providing examples—that the Supreme Court has used “an
array” of different tests to articulate the standard for determining if there is an
unavoidable collision between a state rule and Federal Rule) [hereinafter
Steinman]. Resolving this issue is outside the scope of this comment.
151. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
397 (2010). The Shady Grove doctors added others who Allstate allegedly failed
to pay and made it a class action.
152. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2014) (providing minimal diversity
plus $5 million amount in controversy federal jurisdiction requirements in order
to promote removal of state class action claims to federal court).
153. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (2013)
(“[If] a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action
to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by
statute may not be maintained as a class action.” (emphasis added)).
154. Id. at 396. Also, compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (2013) with FED. R.
CIV. P. 23.
155. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F.Supp.2d
467, 472 (E.D. N.Y. 2006) (“This [statute] was ‘designed to discourage massive
class actions for statutory violations where it would be difficult to identify the
members of the class and where recovery of the statutory minimum by each member
results in a ‘annihilatory punishment.’”). See also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc.,
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Every district court to
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applied because it was “no analogue” to Rule 23,156 employed the
collision test from Burlington Northern and Walker,157 but prudently
indicated that the “Federal Rules should be given their plain
meaning.”158 Conducting this analysis, the Second Circuit found
that: (1) Rule 23, plainly read, is “not sufficiently broad” to cause a
direct collision with a plain reading of § 901(b),159 (2) allowing the
plaintiffs to pursue this action as a class in federal court would
“circumvent” New York’s “state policy” to make the class action
device unavailable in suits involving statutory penalties because the
incentivizing element of the class action device was not present,160
and (3) application of the New York rule does not threaten any
essential characteristic of the federal court system.161
When the Supreme Court decided Shady Grove, the lower courts’
prudent reasoning only remained undisturbed inside Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion. The Scalia plurality rejected the lower
courts’ proper application of procedural Erie doctrine, whereas
Justice Stevens believed that, while Ginsburg’s dissent and the lower
courts’ framework was correct, it was misapplied. Therefore, Shady
Grove produced a plurality decision that held that Rule 23 applied to
the case over a New York rule, but no particular analysis was able to
carry the day as binding precedent for certain guidance.162
consider this question in any detail has concluded that there is no conflict. We
agree.”).
156. Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 143.
157. Id. at 142 (“In analyzing whether a state rule conflicts with a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure, we must “determine whether, when fairly construed,
the scope of [the Federal Rule] is ‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct collision’
with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ before the court, thereby
leaving no room for the operation of that law.” (internal citations omitted)). See
also supra note 146 and accompanying discussion.
158. Id. (internal citation omitted).
159. Id. at 143 (“Rule 23 does not control the issue to which substantive causes
of action may be brought as class actions or which remedies may be sought by class
action plaintiffs.”).
160. Id. at 144–45 (“[Precluding class actions in cases that impose statutory
damages] makes sense, given that class actions are designed in large part to
incentivize plaintiffs to sue when the economic benefit would otherwise be too
small, particularly when taking into account the court costs and attorneys’ fees
typically incurred.”).
161. Id. at 145. Although “the Erie doctrine does not require a federal court
to apply a state rule where it would pose a threat to ‘[a]n essential characteristic
of [the federal court] system,’” the Second Circuit found no reason to believe the
“availability of a class action device in all circumstances is an ‘essential
characteristic’ of the federal court system, particularly where the very cause of
action that Shady Grove seeks to assert is a creature of New York state statute.”
162. Moreover, because Justice Stevens has since retired from the Court and
our lack of knowledge of how Justice Kagan will stand on this issue, we are still
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The Shady Grove Court split over three issues: (1) whether §
901(b) and Rule 23 collided, (2) whether federal courts ought to
diagnose collisions between state rules and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with “sensitivity to state interests,” and (3) how to
determine whether or not a Federal Rule falls within the ambit of the
REA’s authorization.163 Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia applied
Burlington Northern’s collision test that asked whether the Federal
Rule controls the question in dispute.164 Justice Scalia made quick
work of the initial collision analysis, claiming that a plain reading of
Rule 23 “creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit
meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.”165
Because of this “categorical rule,” and the fact that § 901(b)
“answer[s] the same question,” it cannot apply in diversity suits
unless Rule 23 exceeds the REA’s authorization.166 In finding a direct
collision, Justice Scalia found the statute’s clear text determines
whether there is a collision with the Federal Rule.167 Since he found a
collision existed, Justice Scalia proceeded to the next part of Hanna’s
analysis,168 which assesses whether the Federal Rule is within the
REA’s authorization.169 Justice Scalia elected to strictly apply
Sibbach’s “really regulates procedure” test to determine that Rule 23
governs the manner and the means by which litigants’ rights are
enforced, which does not violate the REA’s prohibition on
substantive rights infringement.170 Therefore, Justice Scalia found
Rule 23 to apply over § 901(b).

“left hanging” on what the proper analysis is or should be. See also Steinman,
supra note 150 (noting the different collision analyses before Shady Grove). The
fractured plurality Shady Grove decision certainly failed to sort this issue out.
This comment will not opine on which Justice’s opinion was proper.
163. Although this comment does not directly consider issues 2 and 3, Professor
Margaret Thomas offers interesting insight on them. Margaret S. Thomas,
Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through the Federalism Canons
of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. POL’Y 187 (2013).
164. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
398 (2010) (citing Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987)).
165. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398.
166. Id. at 399. Justice Scalia found that § 901(b) answered the question of
what actions may be brought and sustained as class actions in federal court,
which was exactly what Rule 23 answers.
167. Id. at 403.
168. See Ides supra note 128, at 74–87. The applicability of the Hanna
framework is one of the only things the Shady Grove Court unanimously agreed
upon.
169. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406 (“We must therefore confront head-on
whether Rule 23 falls within the statutory authorization.”).
170. Id. at 407.
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Justice Stevens, while agreeing with the plurality’s result, took a
different route in finding that Rule 23 controls over § 901(b).171 To
determine whether a collision between § 901(b) and Rule 23 existed,
Justice Stevens’ inquiry opted to apply a blend of Burlington
Northern’s “leaves no room for the operation of [state] law” test and
Walker’s acceptance of coexisting state rule and Federal Rule, so
long as a plain reading of both rules aloows for such coexistence.172
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens believed that a Federal Rule
violates the REA if the Federal Rule displaces a state rule conferring
a “state right or remedy that . . . functions to define the scope of the
state-created right[s].”173 Notwithstanding his agreement with
Justice Ginsburg on many issues, Justice Stevens found that Rule 23
applies whenever a federal court is asked to certify a class action.174
He also did not see enough proof of substantive, state policy goals or
the conferring of a right in finding that applying Rule 23 in this case
would overcome § 901(b) and violate the REA.175
Justice Ginsburg, with three other justices, dissented and applied
the same analysis and reached the same conclusion as the district
court and the Second Circuit.176 Her analysis centered around one
crucial question: “Is this conflict really necessary?”177 Justice
Ginsburg recounted the legislative history of § 901(b), which she
concluded successfully demonstrated New York’s purpose in
passing § 901(b) to preclude class actions in suits with statutory
damages to “prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties [through
the class action device]—remedies the New York Legislature
created with individual suits in mind.”178 In other words, New York
sought to enforce a policy of restricting particular lawsuits to
individual plaintiffs, rather than classes of plaintiffs, in order to
rescue particular defendants from paying out massive class action
damages. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg found that “Rule 23 describes
a method of enforcing a [class action] claim for relief, while §
171. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 429–30 (Stevens, J., concurring). On this crucial point, Justice Stevens
agreed with Justice Scalia.
175. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432–33 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is . . . hard
to see how § 901(b) . . . serves the function of defining New York’s rights or
remedies . . . The legislative history, moreover, does not clearly describe a
judgment that § 901(b) would operate as a limitation on New York’s statutory
damages.” Justice Stevens’ perceived lack of legislative judgment for § 901(b) to
be a right or remedy under New York law proved to be a deciding factor in the
Shady Grove decision).
176. See supra note 1555 and accompanying discussion.
177. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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901(b) defines the dimensions of the claim itself.”179 In the lack of a
collision, § 901(b) should have applied.
V. ARTICLE 137 AND FEDERAL RULE 23 DO NOT COLLIDE
Clearly, Shady Grove’s fractured opinion thrust a wrench into
applying Hanna’s initial collision inquiry.180 Luckily, for the
purposes of the sustainability of article 137’s preclusion of class
notice, the Shady Grove opinion does not matter. While the Justices
disagreed on how to apply the collision analysis, all would certainly
agree with the proposition that a rule that governs pre-litigation
behavior and a rule that governs the requirements for a class action
do not collide.181 Notwithstanding the Justices’ differing opinions
regarding the application of the initial collision inquiry, all agreed
that Hanna, Walker, and Burlington Northern’s framework is the
proper analysis.182 Thus, the only relevant issue left for this
comment is to demonstrate that article 137 and Federal Rule 23 in
no way collide because article 137 is pre-litigation and Rule 23 is
contemporaneous with litigation.
Article 137 is a pre-litigation rule that prevents a right of action
from developing until it is satisfied, whereas Rule 23 enumerates the
requirements to maintain a class action in a federal court.183
Moreover, § 901(b) precludes certain claims from being brought as
class actions even though the plaintiffs have a right to bring the
claim,184 whereas article 137 restricts class actions only to those
plaintiffs who give article 137 notice and trigger their right to sue.185
No right of action is present and vicarious exhaustion does not apply

179. Id. at 447 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court, I am convinced, finds conflict where none is necessary.
Mindful of the history behind § 901(b)’s enactment, the thrust of our precedent,
and the substantive-rights limitation in the Rules Enabling Act, I conclude, as
did the Second Circuit and every District Court to have considered the question
in detail, that Rule 23 does not collide with § 901(b).”).
180. Moreover, Justice Stevens has since retired from the Supreme Court, and
we have yet to discover Justice Kagan’s stance on this issue. This raises questions as
to the viability of Shady Grove’s take on the procedural Erie doctrine.
181. See supra Part IV.
182. See id.
183. This avoids falling into Justice Scalia’s “categorical rule” trap, which
Justice Stevens agreed with, and would certainly satisfy Justice Ginsburg. Moreover,
even if there was a collision, it is arguable that article 137 confers a Louisianacreated right, and thus operates over Rule 23 under Justice Stevens’ analysis. See id.
184. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (2013).
185. See supra Part III.B.
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by analogy to allow class representatives who actually gave notice
to satisfy the requirement for the unnamed plaintiffs who did not.186
Moreover, article 137 avoids the pitfalls that § 901(b) fell into
with Justice Scalia’s and Stevens’ opinions because, whereas §
901(b) specifically precludes already-vested claims from being
brought as a class action under New York law,187 article 137
imposes no such limit to class actions. Instead, article 137’s proper
interpretation provides a requirement that prevents a mineral royalty
claim from vesting in order to promote pre-litigation settlement and
allow mineral lessees to conduct a fair investigation into the lessor’s
complaints without the looming specter of a damaging class action
lawsuit.188
Article 137 limits class actions in a drastically different way
than § 901(b) did in Shady Grove. Article 137 does not confer the
original right to sue until each plaintiff performs a particular
action. It thus follows that a class action cannot be filed on behalf
of those who did not satisfy that requirement.189 On the other hand,
§ 901(b) restricts class actions even after each plaintiff obtains the
right to bring an action under that law. It is this feature of § 901(b),
which article 137 does not possess, that brought it within the scope
of the plurality’s collision finding.190
Therefore, unlike the collision that occurred in Shady Grove,
Rule 23 is not broad enough to cover the pre-litigation activity that
article 137 regulates. Because the proper interpretation of article
137 does not fall anywhere near the scope of Rule 23, it must be
applied in federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The concepts discussed in this comment compel the conclusion
that the proper interpretation of article 137 does not collide with
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.191 Thus, the
186. See id.
187. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (2013).
188. See supra Part III.B.
189. See id. The inability of vicarious exhaustion being a suitable analogy
precludes vicarious notice.
190. In other words, Rule 23 is not broad enough to cover the pre-litigation
activity that article 137 regulates. See also notes 153 and 166 and accompanying
discussions. It is beyond the scope of this comment to opine on which Shady
Grove opinion was correct, including whether § 901(b) indeed collided with
Rule 23. It is enough to know that article 137 is nowhere near colliding with
Rule 23, unlike § 901(b).
191. It is beyond the scope of this comment to opine on the propriety of
employing the class action device in mineral royalty suits when each individual
plaintiff must provide article 137 notice.
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proper interpretation should apply in Louisiana federal courts.
Because of this, mineral royalty class actions are substantially
restricted to those class plaintiffs that successfully effectuate article
137 notice.192
This comment fills the void the Louisiana Supreme Court left
when it declined to answer the Fifth Circuit’s certified question of
whether article 137 offers class notice. Although this comment
provides an interpretation of article 137 that is in line with the
tenets of Louisiana statutory construction, potential action of
Louisiana’s highest court nevertheless remains. Further, the
Supreme Court of the United States, especially with the retirement
of Justice Stevens and placement of Justice Kagan, could offer
authoritative procedural Erie doctrine in this post-Shady Grove
era.193 However, at this juncture, the proper interpretation of article
137 survives a proper procedural Erie analysis, leading to the
conclusion that class notice is unavailable in Louisiana federal
courts in mineral royalty class actions, which restricts these classes
to plaintiffs who successfully effectuate article 137 notice.
William K. Wright IV*

192. See supra note 45 and accompanying discussion.
193. Particularly in the realm of the initial collision inquiry, which is the focus of
this comment.
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